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I approach this evening with some trepidation, since all of us will
have our Foresight Hats on, trying to look very far ahead into the future.
Just to keep us honest, I thought I should begin by recalling that in
Dante’s Inferno, a special place in the Eighth Circle of Hell is reserved for
“Diviners” or “Prognosticators” of the future (Canto XX: Circle Eight,
Bolgia 4). Their punishment, for all eternity, is to have their heads
permanently pivoted 180 degrees to the rear, so they are forced to walk
backwards, unable even to see in front of them....
The title of this conference, “Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of
Demographic Change,” might suggest that economic “earthquakes” lie
ahead, but while the metaphor is geological, I do not think it was
intended to be catastrophically geological. In fact, it is quite appropriate to
visualize the demographic trends that we see under way as a kind of
“human tectonics”:
• Tectonic forces are, as you know, hugely powerful, yet very
slow-moving and hence easy to ignore over many decades, yet,
• Tectonic forces embody enormous momentum that cannot be
reversed or contained, and
• Tectonic forces can produce powerfully destructive events (earth-
quakes, volcano eruptions, and the like) if the circumstances do not
allow for their energy to be dissipated in small increments.
Of course, geological time spans centuries, millennia, millions of years.
By these standards, demographic change that takes place over decades is
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change is very slow, gradual, even stately.
If we embrace the imagery of demography as human tectonics,
demographic trends—if left unattended—could produce earthquakes, and
such a possibility has given rise to a number of nightmare fantasies. But
enough of this geology.
What I propose to do is to highlight some of the fantasies, often
political in purpose, and the empirical facts, and then to tell you what
political policy responses might emerge from careful analysis of those
facts—responses that are politically difﬁcult and perhaps painful, but less
alarming and draconian than those that have been widely promoted by
the fantasies.
THE FANTASIES
Since my time is very limited, let me brieﬂy list out for you some of
the evocative language that has been used to describe recent demo-
graphic trends in industrialized countries:
• The birth dearth;






• Plague demography; and
• Demographic senility.
Or perhaps I could quote President Jacques Chirac in 1984, when he was
still Mayor of Paris:
If you look at Europe and then at other continents, the comparison is terrifying.
In demographic terms, Europe is vanishing. Twenty or so years from now, our
countries will be empty, and no matter what our technological strength, we
shall be incapable of putting it to use.2
As M. Chirac was declaiming in this way, Europe held about 705
million persons. Now it has about 730 million. Only three years are left of
the twenty-year period during which, according to his informal forecast,
European countries were to become “empty.”
1 The eminent French historian Pierre Chaunu used this term to describe contraception
and abortion, “the new arsenal against conception and childbirth, inﬁnitely more dangerous
than atomic armaments.” Quoted in Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter, The Fear of
Population Decline, New York, Academic Press, 1985, p. 121.
2 Interview in Liberation, Paris, 30 October 1984.
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We can agree, I think, that these issues have produced some
wonderfully evocative language and exaggerated political rhetoric. But
what are the facts of the matter?
I simplify only a little when I say that there are only three main forces
of demographic change: fertility, mortality, and migration. What is
striking about the present period in the industrialized world is that all
three of these forces are undergoing substantial shifts, and all in direc-
tions that maximize their cumulative effects on important rates of
demographic change.
• Fertility: Fertility rates have declined to low levels, in some places
historical lows (but, as you will see, fertility rates are probably not
as low as some think).
• Mortality: Mortality rates have declined, and hence health and life
expectancy in “old age” have improved rapidly (but, as you will
see, the concept of “old age” may itself be a moving target).
• Migration: High and often increasing rates of international migra-
tion from poorer to richer countries have become common (and the
rates may be higher than some think).
What is especially notable is the intersection of these three trends. The
convergence of low fertility rates, rising life expectancy among the
elderly, and high immigration leads to rates of demographic transforma-
tion in most countries that are essentially unprecedented. I will come
back to this point of intersection in a moment. But ﬁrst let us deal brieﬂy
with each of those three tectonic forces of demography: fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration.
Fertility
The ﬁrst force is fertility, and I have said already that fertility rates
are low in many industrialized countries, in some places historically so.
This is most notably true in Central Europe (especially Germany) and in
Southern Europe—especially Italy and Spain, where the annual fertility
rates are on the order of 1.2 to 1.3 children per woman, or about 40
percent below the notional “replacement rate” of 2.1 children per woman.
Japanese fertility rates are considerably higher, in the range of 1.5
children per woman. And rates are substantially higher in Northern
Europe (France, the United Kingdom, the Nordics) and in North America
(especially the United States), in all of which fertility rates are on the
order of 1.7 to 2.0, and hence only moderately low, notwithstanding the
hype emanating from some political circles. That is one reason that
fertility rates may not be as low as some think.
A second reason is that some (not all) of those historically low annual
fertility rates may partly be a result of temporary distortions that appear
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monly cited in the press are what demographers call “period” rates. They
are synthetic rates, designed to summarize a given year’s fertility
behavior by women of all reproductive ages. When women are deferring
childbearing, these annual fertility rates we calculate are distorted
downward, even if the “cohorts” or “generations” of women who are
doing the deferring ultimately have the same number of children as their
mothers and grandmothers did. This kind of distortion is clearly an
important factor in Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain
(but not in Germany).
“Cohort” rates, in contrast, represent the actual completed family
size of a real population of women who are at or near the end of their
childbearing years. Such rates are more “real” in the sense that they
represent actual completed fertility of women in their thirties or forties,
but they tell us rather little about current rates of younger cohorts of
women, whose fertility behavior dominates the period rates.
Now, you might think that this distinction between “period” and
“cohort” fertility rates would be a subject that only a demographer could
love. But not so. Only a few years ago in Paris, the French national
demographic research institute (l’Institut national d’e ´tudes demographiques,
or INED), which many consider the world’s leading demographic re-
search institution, was nearly destroyed in the crossﬁre of an extraordi-
nary orgy of political and personal vituperation on this issue. It was a
classic of attack and counterattack, from both the left and the right, and
it was splashed all over the pages of the daily Parisian press.
Is a period rate or a cohort rate the best measure of fertility? Those
who chose the “wrong” rate were accused of links to the xenophobes of
the National Front of Le Pen, or of ties to the Nazi collaborationist
government of Marshal Pe ´tain, or of leftish softheadedness. The Paris
paper L’Express called it a “war of Christian demographers versus social
demographers.” Another thundered: “Why Did INED Lie?”
A fair-minded appraisal would be that both period and cohort rates
are meaningful and useful, but they each have their distinctive strengths
and weaknesses. In particular, period rates give us summary measures of
recent fertility but may be distorted by changes in the timing or “tempo”
of fertility. This means that we cannot really know how low cohort
fertility rates will ultimately prove to be in countries such as Italy, where
the average ages of both marriage and ﬁrst birth are rising.
Does it matter? In the very long run, yes, as several of the conference
papers report in detail. We should in no way minimize the challenges that
very low fertility rates will present, even over what demographers
consider the “medium term,” that is, two to three decades. They will
require some very unpleasant trade-offs, especially for Pay-As-You-Earn
(PAYE) state pension systems, most of which are based on implicit
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fertility stays very low.
The politics here are familiar: Understandably, most politicians
prefer to avoid taking politically unpopular actions in the short term to
address long-term problems that will emerge only after they have left
ofﬁce, and they are especially reluctant to act if the predicted long-term
problems are actually rather uncertain.
Mortality
This leads us to the second tectonic force of demography, mortality.
No doubt we all have all heard a lot about this over the past few years.
We have been told that we are threatened by rapid increases in the “old
age dependency ratio” (the number of persons of “working age,”
typically deﬁned as ages 20 to 64 or sometimes 15 to 64, divided by the
number of persons of “old age,” typically deﬁned as 65 and over). This
ratio actually is declining in nearly every country in the world, perhaps
excluding sub-Saharan Africa. The change is the joint product of low
fertility rates at the entry end of the age distribution, coupled with
declining mortality rates at the departure end of the age distribution.
Who can be in favor of deteriorating levels of something called
“old-age dependency”? Neither “old age” nor “dependency” is a very
salubrious term, and the two together can cast a real pall. At the level of
the individual, the very concept of “old age” is associated with torpor,
decadence, senility, and death. Now, I happen to be from Missouri
(really!) and therefore must recall Mark Twain’s comment on this: “Life
would be inﬁnitely happier if we could only be born at the age of 80 and
gradually approach 18.”
Yet the real difﬁculties of old age have produced other fantasies: ﬁrst,
a dubious conceptual leap from the common psychological and cardio-
vascular weaknesses of some elderly individuals right up to the alleged
“senility and sclerosis” of entire human societies. Consider, if you will,
how two very prominent Frenchmen, Robert Debre and Alfred Sauvy,
sought in 1946 to explain the fall of France before the Germans:
The terrible failure of 1940, more moral than material, must be linked to this
dangerous sclerosis. We saw all too often, during the occupation, old men
leaning wearily towards the servile solution, at the time that the young were
taking part in the national impulse towards independence and liberty. This
crucial effect of our senility, is it not a grave warning?3
3 Debre, R. and A. Sauvy, Des Francais pour la France: Le proble `me de la population. Paris.
Gallinard, 1946, p. 58.
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military success.)
Sauvy, perhaps the most eminent French demographer of the post-
war period, went even further, characterizing a population with an older
age composition as economically and intellectually stagnant, with the
following memorable image: “old men, living in old houses, ruminating
about old ideas.”
A second and double-barreled fantasy is embodied in our very
deﬁnition of the demographic indicator “old age dependency ratio.” The
truth is that it no longer really refers to “dependency” nor, honestly, to
“old age.” The measure is deﬁned by arbitrary age boundaries that were
established during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The upper age
boundary was set at 65-plus, largely for purposes of Social Security
eligibility and later for statistical reporting. Yet since the 1930s, life
expectancy and health status (vigor, productivity) at age 65 have im-
proved dramatically. None of us would think of ignoring inﬂation since
1936 in measures of prices, wages, and the like. We always distinguish
between nominal and real currencies and adjust for shifting exchange
rates, and we have even modiﬁed the meaning of “full employment” and
“productivity growth potential.” Yet we persist with an age boundary
for the onset of “old age” that has been constant and unadjusted for
three-quarters of a century.
How might we explain this? Let me quote Mark Twain again: “Iw a s
gratiﬁed,” he wrote, “to be able to answer promptly, and I did. I said I
didn’t know.” Like Twain, I do not know. Is it because we value continuity
of our statistical series above their validity? Might the inertia be explained by
political opposition to the possibility of increases in retirement age? It is
a real puzzle, and an increasingly dangerous one. For our persistence
with the fantasy that in 2001 (or 2050) the onset of “old age” and
“dependency” is at age 65 puts us in danger of misleading . . . ourselves!
Migration
So much for the ﬁrst two tectonic forces of demography, low fertility
and declining mortality. What about the third force, migration, and
especially international migration?
If you think measurement of the true rate of fertility is difﬁcult, take
a look at our measurements of international migration. The data are
based either on estimates of “stocks” of foreign-born persons recorded
every decade in a census, or of “ﬂows” derived as by-products of weak
administrative data collected by government agencies such as the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service or the British Home Ofﬁce. And,
as you probably know, it now appears that the U.S. Census Bureau has
been underestimating the magnitude of net immigration for the past
decade—or at least that is the current guess as to why the actual Census
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Bureau had been expecting.
I do not have time to discuss the complexities of international
migration per se, but I do want to touch brieﬂy on a third realm of
fantasy—that immigration can be a substitute for what demographers call
“natural increase” (that is, the difference between births and deaths). Last
year, the United Nations Population Division published a technical report
entitled “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing
Populations?” The report developed some hypothetical scenarios to the
year 2050, asking the following questions. How many net immigrants
would be required in certain countries:
• To prevent a decline in total population size?
• To hold constant the number aged 15 to 64?4
• To hold constant the “old age dependency ratio”?
This interesting exercise in alternative scenarios was immediately, and
rather wildly, misinterpreted by the press (especially in Europe), by
politicians and advocacy groups, and even by academics with strong
opinions but perhaps weaker knowledge of demography. For example,
some European newspapers reported with bold headlines that the UN
was “recommending” that European governments admit hundreds of
millions of immigrants. A leader of the so-called “World Systems” school
of social theory, Immanuel Wallerstein, immediately concluded that the
UN report showed that “The wealthy countries must choose between
allowing the standard of living of their retired-age persons (an ever-
growing percentage of the whole) to go down considerably OR permit-
ting what will probably seem at ﬁrst an incredibly high number of annual
immigrants from the poor countries.”5
One might be tempted to say to the journalists and to Mr. Waller-
stein: “When in doubt, read the report.” Because this is not what the UN
experts said. To the contrary, the actual report concluded that adjust-
ments to demographic trends “will require objective, thorough and
comprehensive reassessments of many established economic, social and
political policies and programmes.” Moreover, it concluded further that
in countries with very low fertility rates, any effort to halt demographic
aging via immigration policy would require numbers of immigrants that
are likely to be “out of reach because of the extraordinarily large numbers
of migrants that would be required” (p. 4).
For example, the UN scenario conﬁgured to hold constant the ratio of
4 Note that the UN uses 15 to 64 instead of 20 to 64 as “working age,” since its data
include many developing countries. United Nations, “Replacement Migration,” 2000.
5 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Replacement Migration,” Comment No. 32, Jan. 15, 2000.
Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, http:/ /fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm.
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immigrants by 2050, or 3.4 million per year. These numbers might be
compared with the year 2000 population of Germany, which was
estimated at 82 million. Under this hypothetical scenario, the 2050
population of Germany would reach some 300 million, of which 80
percent would be immigrants and their descendants.
Such numbers are not atypical under this scenario. In all of the
low-fertility countries, the populations in 2050 would be far larger than
those of 2000, and immigrants and their offspring would comprise
between three-quarters and seven-eighths of the 2050 total (Tables IV.4
and IV.7).
• Italy would have to admit 120 million, versus its 2000 population
of 57 million. By 2050, 79 percent of the population of Italy would
consist of immigrants and their offspring.
• The European Union as a whole would have to admit 700 million
immigrants (versus the 2000 EU population of about 375 million),
and the admitted immigrants and their offspring would comprise
some 75 percent of the projected 2050 population.
• Japan would have to admit about 553 million immigrants over the
half-century (versus the 2000 Japanese population of 127 million),
and the immigrants and their offspring would constitute about 87
percent of the projected 2050 population.
• The United States would have to admit 593 million immigrants
under this scenario (versus an estimated 2000 population of about
281 million), and these immigrants and their offspring would
comprise about 73 percent of the projected U.S. population in 2050.
The UN experts’ conclusion that such developments might be “out of
reach” is based on their judgment that such a demographic evolution
would be politically unacceptable to the German or Italian or Japanese or
American populations.
This leads me to say a word about the odd American politics of
immigration. It is a politics unlike that of any other public policy issue.
On what other subject could one ﬁnd agreement between organizations
that defend the rights of Mexican-Americans and the notorious exploiters
of Mexican-Americans’ rights among owners and operators of California
fruit and vegetable agriculture? Or between the Cato Institute, on the far
right/libertarian wing of the Republican party, and the leading garment
workers’ union UNITE, far to the progressive/liberal/left of the Demo-
cratic party?
Where might one ﬁnd some environmental groups working together
with groups seeking to eliminate government income transfers and other
beneﬁts to legal immigrants? What kind of subject would attract the likes
of Microsoft, the Service Employees International Union, the American
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tee to join and ﬁnance the same lobbying organization?
When I try to explain to my European friends, who are active
opponents of right-wing anti-immigrant groups in Europe, that the most
visible proponents of unlimited immigration actually come from the
American right (the libertarian wing, such as the Cato Institute and The
Wall Street Journal editorial writers), they frankly do not believe me.
AP ARADOX OF PERCEPTIONS
This leads me ﬁnally to point to a critical “paradox of perceptions”
about immigration, one that sharply divides many of us at this conference
from the rest of the population of the country (or indeed of the world). Of
course I must oversimplify, but to a ﬁrst-order approximation:
• Those of us who look at immigration through the prism of
economics and the labor force often view immigrants as both
substitutes and complements for domestic workers and economic
actors. In this view, immigrants can be analyzed as factors of
production, as packets of human resources, of labor, of skills, of
capital-holders, of prospective taxpayers, or of age characteristics.
• This is not the view of immigration held by broad publics. Instead
they see immigrants not primarily as “factors of production” that
can substitute for or complement domestic factors, but instead as
ﬂesh-and-blood human beings who, like all humans, carry with
them not only their skill sets and human capital, but their cultures,
religions, politics, languages, and values. The Swiss novelist and
playwright Max Frisch summed up the European “guestworker”
(gastarbeiter) programs of the 1960s and 1970s in only a few
memorable words: “We sent for workers, and people came.”
• From the economic view, it is when fertility is very low that
increased immigration is advisable, to ﬁll bottlenecks in labor
markets and add contributors to intergenerational transfer systems
such as Social Security.
• The paradox is that from the public view, it is precisely when
fertility rates are very low that immigration becomes less accept-
able than when fertility is higher.
Why? Here I return, as promised, to the intersection between trends
in fertility, mortality, and migration. When fertility is very low and
mortality is declining, the age structure shifts inevitably toward an
“older” composition. This leads some to lobby for increased immigration,
both as workers and also because immigrants are typically in their
twenties and thirties and come from higher-fertility social settings. But
the combination of low fertility with high immigration produces a rate of
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very visible, and politically contentious.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I want to leave you with the following thoughts as we begin this
conference:
• The demographic trends of low fertility and declining mortality
are indeed the “tectonics” of human societies. They are fundamen-
tally long-term and very gradual in character (at least by the
standards of human lifespans and social science). They have
enormous momentum. If they are ignored, they may prove to be
seismic as well as tectonic.
• Claims that quick ﬁxes—one or two policy shifts, like privatizing
Social Security, raising taxes, or increasing immigration—can deal
with such forces are, well . . . fantasies. Instead, any adjustments to
these trends must be equally long-term, gradual, and of compara-
ble cumulative power. And, as in all such situations, the earlier the
adjustments, the less painful they will be. But such issues are
understandably difﬁcult for politicians who must be reelected next
year, or two to three years from now. In Henry Adams’s book The
Education of Henry Adams, the eminent great-grandson of President
John Adams and grandson of President John Quincy Adams wrote
(perhaps from experience) that “Practical politics consists in ignor-
ing facts.”
• Realistically, the best way forward is changes in multiple policies,
with all such changes modest in scale and gradual in nature, yet all
operating in the same direction, with cumulative effect. Moreover,
these changes need to be informed by a heavy dose of realism.
Fertility increases might be encouraged by public policy, but these
cannot be bought cheaply, and on past experience only modest
rises seem feasible. Immigration numbers might be increased, but
caution would suggest that such increases be both modest in size
and selective for those most likely to succeed economically and
integrate socially. Labor force participation rates can be increased,
but in full recognition that there are practical limits. Public pension
taxes can be raised and pension beneﬁts can be constrained, but
again only modestly. Ofﬁcial pension ages can be increased, and
some pension contributions shifted toward “funded” systems, but
politically such changes will likely have to be both modest and
gradual.
• Finally, to deal with the tectonic forces of demography, a very
long-range perspective is critically important. And yet at the same
time we need to be brutally honest about our abilities for clear
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“the best of the lost arts.”)
Of course, it is true (as Keynes famously said) that “in the long run
we are all dead,” but it is also true that no one, and certainly no
demographer, is capable of accurately forecasting national fertility rates
over the long run of 50 to 100 years. Demographers can do long-range
forecasting better than most—but still quite badly. If we look back only
50 years from tonight, I can assure you that no demographer in 1951 was
anticipating the wild trajectory—upward, downward, upward—that U.S.
fertility rates have actually followed since then. (One splendid advantage
of doing 50- to 100-year projections is that one can never be proved
wrong—except in absentia.... )
I do not wish to be misunderstood. If we are to aspire to understand
the deep implications of these slow-moving tectonic forces of demogra-
phy, we need to produce a wide range of alternate long-range projections.
Yet I hope we can avoid producing our own fantasies by claiming that
any particular 50- to 100-year projection is a credible forecast.
An old Slovenian proverb offers the following judicious advice to
speakers: “Speak the truth—but leave immediately after.” I propose now
to leave the podium, but not before saying that this conference has been
designed to understand the facts of demographic and economic change,
in the hope they are not ignored by politicians who think they are being
“practical.” I wish all of you well in doing so.
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: AN ADDRESS 41